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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress enacted the Customs Courts Act of 1980 (the Act),l 
one of its major objectives2 was to clarify the division of subject matter 
jurisdiction between the district courts and the United States Customs 
Court3 (renamed the United States Court of International Trade).4 To 
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida. 
The author expresses his appreciation to Ed Canal (class of 1988) for his invaluable research 
assistance. 
1. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified in 
scattered sections of titles 19 and 28, United States Code). 
2. In addition to enlarging and clarifying the Customs Court's jurisdiction, Congress 
sought to expand that court's powers to include all powers in equity, thus placing them on par 
with the district courts. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 19-20 (1980), reprinted in 
1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS, at 3730-31 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1235]. 
3. As noted in H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 3730-31. 
Many suits involving international trade issues are ... instituted in the federal 
district courts rather than the U.S. Customs Court. One reason is that often it is 
difficult to determine in advance whether or not a particular case falls within the 
jurisdictional scheme of the Customs Court, that is, an action primarily challenging 
classification and valuation determinations. In addition, because of the limited pow-
ers of the Customs Court, litigants often choose another forum ... where they can 
gain the appropriate relief for their alleged injuries. Most district courts have refused 
... such suits, citing the Constitutional mandate requiring uniformity of decisions 
relating to imports. (See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.) .... The result has been inconsistent 
judicial decisions. . . . Thus, some individuals will obtain relief which is denied 
others, who by chance select an improper forum to institute suit. ... 
. . . Congress is greatly concerned that numerous individuals and firms ... are 
1 
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this end, Congress conferred upon the U.S. Court of International Trade 
(CIT) exclusive jurisdiction over most civil actions involving imports to 
the United States.s Despite assurances by Congress that the Act would 
clarify matters involving import transactions (by putting these matters 
within the exclusive purview of the CIT),6 recent appellate decisions in 
the area of grey market goods show that these jurisdictional waters re-
main murky.7 
In three appellate decisions8 involving the Genuine Goods Exclu-
sion Act,9 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), 
the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Second Circuit were presented 
expending significant amounts of time and money in a futile effort to obtain judicial 
review of the merits of their case. 
4. Under the Customs Courts Act of 1980, the name of the Customs Court was changed 
to the United States Court ofInternational Trade. Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 251,94 Stat. 1727, 
1728 (1980). 
5. Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1728-30 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.c. §§ 1581-
1583, 1585 (1982)). See H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 3731. The House Judiciary 
Committee commented: "The Customs Courts Act of 1980 creates a comprehensive system of 
judicial review of civil actions arising from import transactions, utilizing the specialized exper-
tise of the United States Customs Court. . .. This comprehensive system will ensure greater 
efficiency in judicial resources and uniformity in the judicial decision making process." One 
subject area over which the CIT lacks jurisdiction is actions involving imports of obscene 
materials. 28 U.S.C. § 15810) (1982). 
6. S. REP. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 466]. "S.1654 
would make it clear that the United States Court of International Trade possesses broad juris-
diction to entertain civil actions arising out of import transactions." ld.; "H.R.7540 will re-
solve this problem [of dismissals for lack of jurisdiction] by defining the demarcation between 
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade and the federal district courts." H.R. REP. 
No. 1235, supra note 2, at 3741. 
7. Compare Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 316 (2d Cir. 1986) (CIT does 
not possess exclusive jurisdiction over actions arising under 19 U.S.C. § 1526) and Coalition to 
Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (same), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986) (86-625) with Vivitar Corp. 
v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986) (CIT 
possesses exclusive jurisdiction over actions arising under 19 U.S.C. § 1526). See also Ken-
nedy, A Proposal to Abolish the U.S. Court 0/ International Trade, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 13 
(1985), where the author notes, "Whether or not the 1980 amendments have achieved their 
intended purpose of eliminating this jurisdictional confusion [between the district courts and 
the CIT] remains an open question." ld. at 16. 
8. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986); Coalition to Preserve 
the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986) (86-625) [hereinafter COPIA1]; Vivitar Corp. 
v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). 
9. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified as amended by the Customs Procedural 
Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, 92 Stat. 888, at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 
(1982)). Section 526(a) provides in part: 
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign 
manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or re-
ceptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association 
created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and 
Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States, under the provisions of 
sections 81 to 109 of title 15, and if a copy of the certificate of registration of such 
trademark is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, in the manner provided in 
section 106 of said title 15, unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is 
produced at the time of making entry. 
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an identical jurisdictional issue: whether grey market goods actions 10 
under section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,!1 are within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT.12 In Vivitar Corp. v. United 
States,13 the Federal Circuit answered this question in the affirmative. 14 
One year to the day later in Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Ameri-
can Trademarks v. United States (COPIAT),15 the D.C. Circuit parted 
company with the Federal Circuit, answering that question in the nega-
tive. Three days after the COPIAT decision, the Second Circuit, in 
Olympus Corp. v. United States, 16 joined the D.C. Circuit in rejecting the 
contention that the CIT possesses exclusive jurisdiction over section 
526(a) cases instituted against the United States. 17 
This article first sketches the jurisdictional conflict between the Viv-
itar decision, on the one hand, and the COPIAT and Olympus decisions, 
on the other. That section is followed by a discussion of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(i), the CIT's so-called "residual jurisdiction" provision. IS The ar-
ticle concludes that this jurisdictional conflict is symptomatic of an in-
herent tension built into the Act, namely, the desire for jurisdictional 
10. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained the nature of grey market 
goods in Vivitar: 
Goods are produced and legitimately sold abroad under a particular trademark and 
are imported into the United States and sold in competition with goods of the owner 
of U.S. trademark rights in the identical mark. But for international boundaries and 
the territoriality of trademark rights, the use of the trademark in competition with 
the U.S. owner would not constitute infringement because of the relationship be-
tween the foreign entity from whom the goods were directly or indirectly obtained 
and the owner of U.S. rights in the mark. In this sense, grey market goods are "gen-
uine" and bear a "genuine" trademark. In some instances, the U.S. trademark owner 
is an importer of the goods as well, in which case the grey market goods are known 
as "parallel importations." 
Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555. See Note, The Greying 0/ American Trademarks: The Genuine 
Goods Exclusion Act and the Incongruity o/Customs Regulation 19 C.F.R. § 133.21,54 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 83 (1985); Note, Parallel Importation-Legitimate Goods or Trademark In-
fringement?, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 543 (1985); Note, Vivitar Corp. v. United States and 
Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo: The Issue 0/ Common Control in the Parallel Importation 0/ 
Trademarked Goods, 17 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 177 (1985). 
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982). 
12. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 904; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 316-18; Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1557-58. 
13. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). 
14. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1557-58. 
15. 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986) 
(86-625). 
16. 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986). 
17. Id. at 316. Unlike the D.C. Circuit in COPIAT, the Second Circuit upheld the Cus-
toms Service regulations. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1986). 
18. See Vance, The Unrealized Jurisdiction 0/28 u.s.c. § 1581(i): A View/rom the Plain-
tiff's Bar, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 793 (1984); Cohen, Recent Decisions o/the Court o/Illtema-
tional Trade Relating to Jurisdiction: A Primer and A Critique, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 700, 
743-46 (1984) [hereinafter Cohen, Recent Decisions]; Cohen, The "Residual Jurisdictioll" o/the 
Court 0/ International Trade Under the Customs Courts Act 0/1980, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
471,472 (1981) [hereinafter Cohen, Residual Jurisdiction]. 
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certainty competing with a congressional desire for a narrowly drafted 
statute. 
The conflict can be resolved in one of two ways. First, it can be 
addressed on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis with a concomitant return of 
the jurisdictional uncertainty that plagued litigants prior to enactment of 
the Act. Alternatively, the CIT's residual jurisdictional provision19-in 
the author's view, the primary source of mischief-can be repealed. In 
any event, uniformity in international trade decisions and jurisdictional 
certainty are unattainable under the current jurisdictional statutory 
scheme. In the interest of jurisdictional certainty for prospective interna-
tional trade litigants, this article proposes either substantial revision of 
section 1581(i) or, preferably, its repeal. 
II. THE VIVITAR, COP/AT, AND OLYMPUS DECISIONS 
The basic fact patterns in the Vivitar, COP/AT, and Olympus cases 
are essentially identical: U.S. trademark owners sought to prevent im-
portation of goods that lawfully bore the owner's trademark. In Vivitar, 
a U.S. trademark owner filed suit in the CIT seeking to prevent the unau-
thorized importation of certain goods. The goods were manufactured 
abroad by the trademark owner's licensees and carried the trademark 
owner's trademark.2o In COP/AT, a trade association of U.S. companies 
that own U.S. trademarks and two of its members brought an action in 
district court,21 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued 
that Customs Service regulations,22 promulgated pursuant to section 
526(a) (permitting grey market goods to enter the United States), are 
19. 28 u.s.c. § 1581(i) (1982). That section provides: 
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International Trade by 
subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the exception set forth in subsection 
G) of this section [28 U.S.C. § 15810)], the Court of International Trade shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United States, its 
agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the United States providing for-
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage; 
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise 
for reasons other than the raising of revenue; 
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of 
merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety; 
or 
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred 
to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)-(h) of this section 
[28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(h)]. 
20. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555. 
21. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 598 F. 
Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
22. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(I)-(3) (1986). The regulations at 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 provide in 
part: 
(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domestic 
manufacture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded trademark or 
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invalid because of inconsistencies with other statutes?3 In Olympus, a 
U.S. subsidiary and exclusive U.S. distributor of a foreign manufacturer 
of trademarked goods sought declaratory and injunctive relief from those 
same Customs regulations.24 
In addressing the jurisdictional issue in Vivitar, the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged the divergent views on this question,25 noting the district 
court decisions in COPIAT and Olympus which had specifically rejected 
the argument that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving 
grey market goods?6 Despite these contrary authorities, the Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that the CIT had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1581(a), (i)(3), and/or (i)(4).27 
In order to resolve the jurisdictional question, the Federal Circuit 
observed, "[t]he focus must be solely on whether the claim falls within 
the language and intent of the jurisdictional grant to the CIT.,,28 Viv-
itar's claim raised no question of substantive trademark law with respect 
to the activities of a private party-a claim that would be within the 
district court's jurisdiction29-but rather went to the validity of Customs 
trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture as prohibited importa-
tions. A "copying or simulating" mark or name is an actual counterfeit of the re-
corded mark or name or is one which so resembles it as to be likely to cause the 
public to associate the copying or simulating mark with the recorded mark or name. 
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical 
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or 
association created or organized within the United States are subject to seizure and 
forfeiture as prohibited importations. 
(c) Restriction not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when: 
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark ... are owned by the same 
person or business entity; 
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark ... owners are parent and sub-
sidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control (see 
§§ 133.2(d) and 133.12(d»; 
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark . . . 
applied under authorization of the U.S. owner. 
23. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 906. 
24. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 316-17. 
25. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1559. 
26. Id. The two cases cited by the Federal Circuit were the district court decisions in 
COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984) and Olympus Corp. v. United States, No. CV-84-
0920 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1984) (unpublished order), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986). See 
Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1559. See also Parfums Stem, Inc. v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 416 
(S.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that jurisdiction over an action brought under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) is 
proper in the district court). 
27. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555. The government argued that the district court hadjurisdic-
tion over all trademark actions, including those brought under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a), pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which grants to the district courts jurisdiction over "any civil action 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and 
trade-marks." The government further argued that since the CIT's jurisdiction is exclusive 
only, not concurrent with that of the district courts, the CIT has no jurisdiction over Vivitar's 
action. Id. at 1557-58. 
28. Id. at 1559-60. 
29. Id. at 1560. See, e.g., Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 598 F. Supp. 1163, 1179 
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regulations governing the exclusion of goods. As such, it was "the type 
of question to which the CIT can bring expertise"30 and over which the 
CIT thus had exclusive jurisdiction.31 The Federal Circuit found juris-
diction to exist either as a corollary to the CIT's protest jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a),32 or alternatively, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(i)(3) and/or (4) as an action against the United States that arises 
out of an embargo on certain goods and the administration and enforce-
ment thereof. 33 
The D.C. Circuit in COPIAT and the Second Circuit in Olympus 
were totally at odds with the jurisdictional portion of the Federal Cir-
cuit's opinion in Vivitar. After summarizing the Federal Circuit's opin-
ion,34 the D.C. Circuit concluded that "the language of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(a) and (i)(4) will not bear the Federal Circuit's construction."35 
First, in connection with section 1581(a) and (i)(4) jurisdiction, the D.C. 
Circuit explained that since no right to protest arises from Customs ad-
mission of goods into the United States, only from the exclusion thereof, 
there could neither be a denial of a protest nor any administration and 
enforcement of protests.36 Second, as for the Federal Circuit's alterna-
tive holding that the CIT has jurisdiction under section 1581(i)(3), the 
D.C. Circuit disagreed that exclusion of goods under section 526(a) is an 
"embargo" within the contemplation of section 1581(i)(3).37 In the D.C. 
Circuit's view, "the structure of the statute ... indicates that section 
1581(i)(3) only extends to quotas and embargoes arising out of trade pol-
icy, the sort of measures that have traditionally limited the importation 
of shoes, textiles, automobiles, and the like.,,38 The D.C. Circuit con-
cluded that "Congress' overriding purpose was to consolidate jurisdic-
tion over certain matters involving international trade in a single 
specialized court, bringing uniformity and expertise to the area. But 
those ends would not be served in this case."39 
In the Olympus decision, the Second Circuit reached the same con-
clusion as that of the D.C. Circuit regarding the exclusivity of the CIT's 
jurisdiction over grey market goods cases, and it employed essentially the 
(S.D. N.Y. 1984) (district court granted exclusive distributor's motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion based upon 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1124). 
30. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1560. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. A protest is an administrative complaint filed with the Customs Service challeng-
ing, inter alia, classification and duty rates. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514-1515 (1984). 
33. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1560. 
34. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 905-07. 
35. Id. at 906. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 906-07. 
38. Id. at 907. 
39. Id. 
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same rationale used in COPIAT. First, regarding the CIT's jurisdiction 
under section 1581(a) and (i)(4), the Second Circuit rejected the argu-
ment that section 1581(a) had any applicability inasmuch as no goods 
had been excluded.40 The court likewise rejected the argument that sec-
tion 1581(i)(4) was an appropriate jurisdictional base "simply because 
[an action] tangentially relates to the protest procedure.,,41 The Second 
Circuit added that "section 1581(i)(4) properly gives the CIT jurisdiction 
only of those [administration and enforcement] matters that arise from 
protests themselves, not of all issues that conceivably could arise in a 
protest action under a hypothetical fact situation."42 While recognizing 
the congressional desire for uniformity in the international trade decision 
making process reflected in the Act, the Second Circuit rejected the con-
tention that uniformity would be promoted "because this action primar-
ily involves antitrust and trademark matters, areas outside the expertise 
of the CIT.,,43 As for the Federal Circuit's alternative holding that "em-
bargo" jurisdiction existed under section 1581(i)(3), the Second Circuit 
viewed 526(a) (a law providing in essence for quantitative restrictions of 
zero)44 as not within the contemplation of Congress when it enacted sec-
tion 1581(i)(3).45 Rather, the court concluded, the quantitative restric-
tions Congress had in mind were those imposed by quotas on textiles.46 
The Second Circuit thus rejected wholesale the Federal Circuit's jurisdic-
tional analysis in Vivitar, adopting in large measure the D.C. Circuit's 
COPIAT reasoning in this connection. 
The decisions reached by the D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit that 
the CIT does not possess exclusive jurisdiction over section 526(a) ac-
tions instituted against the United States are, of course, conclusions that 
the CIT has no jurisdiction over such actions whatsoever, given that the 
CIT's jurisdiction in all instances is expressly exclusive of,47 not concur-
rent with,48 that of the district courts. 
At first blush this conclusion would seem flawed when examined in 
light of the legislative history of the Customs Courts Act of 1980. Both 
the Senate and House Reports49 to the Act are replete with references to 
the need for uniformity in judicial decision making. Hence, Congress 
accorded the CIT "broad jurisdiction to entertain certain civil actions 
40. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 319. 
46. Id. 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(i) (1984). 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1982). 
49. See supra notes 5-6. 
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arising out of import transactions"50 and created "a comprehensive sys-
tem of judicial review of civil actions arising from import transactions, 
utilizing the specialized expertise of the CIT."51 
On closer examination of the CIT's jurisdictional mandate and the 
accompanying legislative history, however, it is evident that Congress did 
not make the CIT's jurisdiction over import transactions comprehen-
sive.52 On the contrary, Congress hedged and even retreated from such a 
sweeping jurisdictional scheme. 53 In addition, considering earlier drafts 
of section 1581 (i), 54 Congress was obviously sensitive to concerns raised 
by certain importers that section 1581(i) not be overly broad and, for that 
reason, ultimately adopted "a more precise subsection."55 Thus, which 
of the three courts of appeals' decisions best comports with congressional 
intent is a close question. 
A more perplexing problem from the perspective of the international 
trade bar is the uncertainty in which international trade litigants now 
find themselves as a consequence of the decisions. It is true that the 
Supreme Court stands ready to resolve such intercircuit conflicts. 56 Liti-
gants might find some comfort in that fact if these three decisions were 
merely isolated instances of jurisdictional uncertainty between the dis-
trict courts and the CIT. Regrettably, however, in other contexts liti-
gants have been placed in a position of uncertainty over whether the CIT 
50. S. REP. No. 466, supra note 6, at 4. 
51. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 3731. 
52. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 15810) (1982). Moreover, the United States must be either a 
party-plaintiff or party-defendant to any action brought in the CIT. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-
1582 (1982). 
Despite the frequent congressional assertions of the importance of placing in one court the 
responsibility for resolving all matters involving import transactions, Congress undoubtedly 
questioned the wisdom of entrusting to the CIT the power to resolve all actions involving 
import transactions to which the United States is a party. The most notable example of this 
reluctance is the jurisdictional exception contained at 28 U.S.C. § 15810) (1984). This subsec-
tion specifically carves out cases arising out of the importation of immoral articles. See section 
305 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982). Section 305 includes 
within the ambit of "immoral articles," treasonous and obscene materials. Although the legis-
lative history does not disclose the reason for this exception (other than to note that the provi-
sion restates existing law), the constitutional requirement of prompt judicial review following 
seizure of materials alleged to be obscene may explain why the district courts retained jurisdic-
tion over actions brought under 19 U.S.C. § 1305. See H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 
3760. Prompt review would not be possible in the CIT if the seizure occurred at a port of 
entry other than New York City (the location of the CIT). In addition, it may have been 
Congress' belief that actions involving the importation of obscene and seditious materials 
presented more of a free speech/free press issue than one involving imports per se. 
Whatever Congress' reasons for maintaining this exception, section 15810) serves as a 
testimonial to the congressional concerns about entrusting to the CIT exclusive jurisdiction 
over all actions involving import transactions in which the United States is a litigant. 
53. See supra note 52; H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 3758-59. 
54. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. 
55. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 3759. 
56. SUP. CT. R. 17. 
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has jurisdiction to decide a particular issue. 57 As the next section on the 
Act's legislative history explains, the principal source of this uncertainty 
is section 1581(i) as presently enacted. 
III. SECTION 1581(i) AND THE CHIMERAS OF 
CERTAINTY AND UNIFORMITY 
Prior to enactment of section 1581(i), the jurisdiction of the CIT's 
predecessor, the Customs Court, was limited to review of Customs Ser-
vice denials of protests concerning exclusion of merchandise, classifica-
tion, and valuation of importS.58 Then, as now, the Customs Court's 
jurisdiction was exclusive. 59 Despite the statutory simplicity of this juris-
dictional scheme, problems soon arose in cases where an importer wished 
to challenge a Customs Service regulation prior to actual importation.60 
The Customs Court's jurisdiction could only be invoked after the denial 
of a protest by the Customs Service, and district court jurisdiction ex-
tended to those matters over which the Customs Court lacked 
jurisdiction. 
The question then arose whether a prospective importer could chal-
lenge a Customs Service regulation in district court prior to a protest. 
The decisions treating this question were not uniform.61 In the Customs 
Courts Act of 1980, Congress hoped to resolve the confusion between 
district court and Customs Court jurisdiction. 62 
57. Compare American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers-Textile and Apparel Group v. 
United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1245-46 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (CIT had jurisdiction under section 
1581(i) over action challenging textile quotas) and United States Cane Refiners' Ass'n v. 
Block, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (CIT had jurisdiction under section 1581(i) over 
action challenging sugar quotas) with American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 
718 F.2d 1546, 1550-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (action properly dismissed since CIT lackedjurisdic-
tion under section 1581(i) where protest action under section 1581(a) was not shown to be 
inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984) and Arbor Foods, Inc. v. United States, 600 F. 
Supp. 217, 220 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1984) (action challenging imposition of sugar quotas dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction under section 1581(i». See also United States v. Gold Mountain Coffee, 
Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 510, 514 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (CIT declined ancillary jurisdiction over 
civil forfeiture action brought for violation of customs laws). 
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976), repealed by Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980). 
59. The statute providing for federal question jurisdiction over import matters in the dis-
trict courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1976), specifically excluded concurrent jurisdiction between the 
district courts and the Customs Court over international trade matters. 
60. Compare Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. United States, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977) with Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agree-
ments, 561 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978). 
61. See Annotation, Jurisdictioll of Ullited States Customs Court Ullder § 1 JO(a}, (b) of 
Customs Courts Act of 1970 (28 u.s.C.S. § 1582(a),(b)), 50 A.L.R. FED. 378 (1980). 
62. See, e.g., American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers-Textile & Apparel Group V. 
United States, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985), where the court noted: 
The decision to clarify and expalld the jurisdiction of the CIT-rather than to clarify 
the jurisdiction of the district courts-as a means for resolving the jurisdictional 
HeinOnline -- 9 Hous. J. Int’l L. 10 1986-1987
10 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 9:1 
A reading of the legislative history of section 1581(i) leaves little 
room for doubt that Congress justified the provision by claiming it elimi-
nated the blurred jurisdictional boundary between district court and CIT 
jurisdiction.63 However, as the Vivitar, COP/AT, and Olympus decisions 
demonstrate, the statutory provision that Congress finally enacted to im-
plement its jurisdictional scheme, section 1581(i), has poorly served the 
dual goals of certainty and uniformity.64 While the legislative history of 
the Act reflects a strong congressional desire for jurisdictional certainty 
and uniformity of decision making in the international trade field, the 
history is lean in furnishing appropriate analytical tools with which to 
realize these goals. 
For example, the Report of the House Judiciary Committee spot-
lighted the difficulties litigants faced in determining the proper forum in 
which to bring their international trade actions. The House Report 
noted: 
[T]he intricacies of the Customs Court's jurisdictional statutes 
and the complexities of international trade litigation have ren-
dered it exceedingly difficult for litigants to determine whether 
or not a particular case comes within the jurisdiction of the 
Customs Court and is, therefore, excluded from the jurisdiction 
of the district courts. This has resulted in considerable confu-
sion by litigants and the courtS.65 
Similarly, the Senate judiciary Committee Report spelled out the 
intended effect of the new Act: 
Because the statutes defining the jurisdiction of the Customs 
Courts are so intricate and because international trade 
problems have become so complex, it has become increasingly 
problem indicates that Congress intended plaintiffs in appellants' shoes to bring their 
cases in the CIT rather than in the district court. 
Id. at 1245. 
63. See Cohen, Recent Decisions, supra note 18, at 770. 
64. H.R. REP. No. 1235, note 2, at 3730-31, 3741; S. REP. No. 466, supra note 6, at 3-4. 
65. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 30. The Report went on to cite several cases in 
support of its contention: 
Id. 
See SCM Corp. v. United States International Trade Commission, 549 F.2d 812 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977). Some district courts have asserted jurisdiction over international trade 
actions. See Sneaker Circus v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977); Timken Co. v. 
Simon, 539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976). However, other district courts have com-
pounded this problem by dismissing such actions for want of jurisdiction. See COII-
sumers Union of United States v. Committee for the Implemelltation of Textile 
Agreements, 561 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1977); ... 
The dismissal of these actions, after great expenditures of time and resources, 
has produced frustration on the part of litigants and the courts. H.R. 7540 will re-
solve this problem by defining the demarcation between jurisdiction of the Court of 
International Trade and the federal district courts. 
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more difficult to determine, in advance, whether or not a partic-
ular case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs 
Court and is therefore excluded from the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict courts. The result has been considerable confusion which 
has been demonstrated by the fact that a significant number of 
civil actions have been instituted in the district courts only to 
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. . . . 
The dismissal of these actions has resulted in the expendi-
ture of time and effort by individuals who believe that they have 
real grievances in this field only to find that their cases will not 
be heard on its merits. The amended bill attempts to solve this 
problem by clarifying the existing jurisdictional statutes relat-
ing to the United States Customs Court and by expanding the 
jurisdiction of the Court. . . .66 
11 
Notwithstanding the wealth of congressional statements on the im-
portance and desirability of having jurisdictional certainty and decisional 
uniformity in international trade litigation, the jurisdictional provision 
which was enacted was not drafted with sufficient breadth, largely out of 
fears that the CIT would adjudicate matters traditionally within the ex-
clusive purview of the district courtS.67 By comparison, in one of its ear-
liest drafts,68 section 1581(i) would have given the Customs Court 
jurisdiction over a civil action arising under the Constitution, a law, 
treaty, executive agreement, or executive order if the subject matter of 
the action "directly affected" imports.69 Although subsequent versions 
66. S. REp. No. 466, supra note 6, at 4-5. The Senate Report further noted: 
The clarification and expansion of the customs courts' jurisdiction is warranted not 
only because it will eliminate the considerable jurisdictional confusion which now 
exists, but because of two other important considerations: considerations of judicial 
economy, and the need to increase the availability of judicial review in the field of 
international trade in a manner which results in uniformity without sacrificing the 
expeditious resolution of import related disputes. 
[d. at 4. The Senate Report identified another important consideration for enactment of the 
Act: "assuring our trading partners that administrative determinations in this area will be 
subject to judicial review only by a limited number of courts .... " [d. 
67. See H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, where the House Judiciary Committee noted 
the following: 
The American Importers Association (AlA) testified that subsection (i) could have 
been interpreted to permit the court to assert jurisdiction over civil actions involving 
the application of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act or the Toxic Substances 
Control Act to imported merchandise. AlA believed that these actions do not in-
volve questions of classification, valuation or rate of duty but rather questions of 
public health and safety .... 
In keeping with the intent of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 to provide a 
uniformity of jurisdiction, the Committee adopted a more precise subsection (i) in an 
effort to remove any confusion over the jurisdiction of the Court of International 
Trade regarding this or similar issues. 
[d. at 3759 (footnote omitted). 
68. S. 2857, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
69. [d. This Senate bill exempted several types of civil actions from the Customs Court's 
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of section 1581 (i) underwent jurisdictional narrowing, they were still 
broader than the current version of section 1581(i). 
One early draft, for example, would have required a civil action not 
only to "arise directly from import transactions"70 or to "arise out of 
import transactions,'>71 but also to "involve" specific statutes by name, or 
to "involve" a provision of the Constitution, a treaty, law, executive 
agreement, or executive order that directly and substantially involve in-
ternational trade.72 An earlier Senate version of section 1581(i) would 
have expanded the Customs Court's jurisdiction to include any civil ac-
tion involving (I) imports and (2) a statute, constitutional provision, 
treaty, executive agreement, or executive order directly and substantially 
concerned with international trade.73 
Concerns were raised by importers that the proposed drafts of sec-
tion 1581(i) were overly broad,74 so the current section 1581(i) was 
adopted instead as "a more precise subsection, ,,75 in the view of the 
House judiciary Committee. Whether the desired precision has been 
achieved is open to considerable doubt in light of the Vivitar, COP/AT, 
and Olympus decisions. The three decisions leave little doubt that the 
congressional desire for statutory precision sacrificed considerations of 
jurisdictional certainty and decisional uniformity. 
If one of the earliest versions of section 1581(i) had been enacted, 
would this jurisdictional conflict have resulted? Arguably not. Under the 
hybrid version of section 1581(i), derived by engrafting portions of S. 
jurisdiction, such as antitrust actions and actions arising under the Freedom of Information 
Act. 
70. S. 1654, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONGo REC. 11,473 (1979). 
71. H.R. 7540, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONGo REC. 26,546. 
72. Supra notes 68-71. For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of section 
1581(i), see Cohen, Residual Jurisdiction, supra note 18, at 498-501. 
73. See S. 1654, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. REP. No. 466, supra note 6, at 5. Pro-
posed section 1581(i), as contained in section 201(a) ofH.R. 6394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), 
reads as follows: 
(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International 
Trade by subsections (a) through (h) of this section and subject to the exceptions set 
forth in subsection G) of this section, the Court of International Trade shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action against the United States, its agencies, or its 
officers, which-
(1) arises directly from an import transaction; and 
(2)(A) involves the Tariff Act of 1930, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 
the Trade Act of 1974, or the Trade Agreements Act of 1979; or 
(B) involves a provision of-
(i) the Constitution of the United States; 
(ii) a treaty of the United States; 
(iii) an executive agreement executed by the President; or 
(iv) an Executive order of the President, which directly and sub-
stantially involves international trade. 
74. See supra note 67. 
75. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 3759. 
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2857 onto H.R. 6394,76 the CIT would have been vested with exclusive 
jurisdiction over all civil actions that "involve imports,,77 and "the Tariff 
Act of 1930."78 The grey market goods actions filed in Vivitar, COPIAT, 
and Olympus would fall squarely within the ambit of such a jurisdictional 
provision. An action to exclude grey market goods from entry into the 
United States would "involve imports." Moreover, such an action, being 
brought under section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, would clearly 
satisfy the second prong of this hybrid jurisdictional statute. By limiting 
the scope of the residual jurisdictional statute to specifically named stat-
utes such as the Tariff Act of 1930, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 
and the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,19 the objection80 that it would be 
difficult to determine whether a civil action involves a treaty, constitu-
tional provision, or executive agreement which "directly and substan-
tially involves international trade"81 would be met. To eliminate this 
source of potential confusion, the proposed hybrid statute therefore 
would have deleted references to the Constitution, treaties, and executive 
agreements or orders as originally contained in H.R. 6394,82 and would 
instead list the specific statutes involving imports over which jurisdiction 
extended. 
This proposed amendment to section 1581(i) might have advanced 
the goal of jurisdictional certainty, but in the end it could neither guaran-
tee certainty nor could it necessarily secure the companion goal of deci-
sional uniformity. The goal of uniformity in judicial decision making has 
been, and will continue to be, a will-o'-the-wisp as long as CIT judges are 
free to part paths with their brothers and sisters on the CIT.83 Such 
76. Supra notes 68 & 73. 
77. S. 2857, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
78. H.R. 6394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONGo !tEe. H496 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1980) 
[hereinafter H.R. 6394]. 
79. By listing the statutes over which the CIT has residual jurisdiction, the objection 
raised that the CIT's jurisdiction might become too broad and encompass statutes such as the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act would be met. See supra note 67. 
80. The American Bar Association expressed fears that the district courts and the Court 
of International Trade would reach conflicting interpretations of the provision. See Proposed 
Amendments to the Customs Courts Act: Hearings on H.R. 6394 Be/ore the Subcomm. on 
Monopolies and Commercial Law 0/ the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
106 (1980). 
81. H.R. 6394, supra note 73. 
82. Id. 
83. Compare Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1983) with Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'I Trade 
1984) alld Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'1 Trade 1985), appeal dis-
missed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986), where the CIT has taken different tacks in answering 
the question whether certain government subsidies to industry are subject to countervailing 
duties. 
For an example of a direct conflict among three Customs Court judges on a similar issue, 
compare ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1187 (Cust. Ct. 1979), rev'd, 610 F.2d 
770 (C.C.P.A. 1979) alld ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1195 (Cust. Ct. 
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uniformity is unachievable as long as an independent jUdiciary is the de-
cision maker. From the perspective of fostering amicable trade relations 
with our trading partners, it would certainly be desirable to have perfect 
uniformity in decision making on the part of the federal judiciary, but 
such uniformity cannot be legislated. 
Insofar as jurisdictional certainty is concerned, ingenuous (and dis-
ingenuous) lawyers who practice in cities other than New York, the site 
of the Court of International Trade, may not be overly anxious to file an 
action in the CIT. In close jurisdictional cases, therefore, attorneys may 
advance plausible arguments for why the district courts should take juris-
diction over the particular action. The pressure to make such arguments 
will be great where the need for expeditious judicial relief is most acute.84 
In addition, the determination of whether an action arises out of an im-
port transaction is subject to manipulation. For example, the Second 
Circuit characterized the grey market goods issue in Olympus as "pri-
marily involv[ing] antitrust and trademark matters, areas outside the ex-
pertise of the CIT."85 In short, broadening the scope of section 1581(i) is 
no guarantee of jurisdictional certainty. 
If Congress desires jurisdictional certainty in the field of interna-
tional trade litigation, a rational legislative response to the Vivitar, 
COPIAT, and Olympus trilogy would be to repeal section 1581(i),86 
thereby conferring upon the district courts jurisdiction to hear all 
"residual" international trade cases. 87 Existing jurisdictional statutes 
would adequately fill the gap left by a repeal of section 1581(i), such as 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1340 
(conferring upon the district courts jurisdiction to hear cases involving 
1979), rev'd, 610 F.2d 785 (C.C.P.A. 1979) with ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. 
Supp. 1200 (Cust. Ct. 1979). 
The Federal Circuit may eventually resolve such conflicts on appeal. Until it does, how-
ever, our foreign trading partners will not know exactly where they stand. This concern was 
voiced by the Senate when it considered the Customs Courts Act of 1980. S. REP. No. 466, 
supra note 6, at 3-4. 
84. One of the major defects with the CIT is its New York City location. The location 
contributes in large measure to the virtual monopoly that East coast law firms (particularly 
those in New York City) enjoy in international trade law practice. See Kennedy, supra note 7, 
at 31-32. 
85. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318. 
86. Repeal of section 1581(i) would not only represent a rational legislative response, but 
it would also be the more probable legislative response. A recent bill that was introduced in 
the Senate would have eliminated the CIT's jurisdiction to review antidumping and counter-
vailing duty determinations. See S. 1672, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONGo REC. SlO,755-57 
(1983). Although this bill was not enacted, it nevertheless reflects some congressional dissatis-
faction with the role of the CIT in international trade litigation. Given this legislative atmos-
phere, it seems unlikely that Congress would be prepared to enlarge the CIT's jurisdiction by 
making section 1581(i) a more sweeping provision. 
87. For statistics suggesting that the burden on the district courts from the additional 
caseload would be light, see Kennedy, supra note 7, at 34-36. 
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revenue from imports). This latter provision, if expanded to include ac-
tions affecting imports for nonrevenue purposes, would subsume the 
lion's share of cases formerly falling within the CIT's section 1581(i) 
jurisdiction. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When it enacted the Customs Courts Act of 1980, Congress sought 
to eliminate the jurisdictional confusion that had plagued international 
trade litigants prior to 1980. That confusion unfortunately persists, as 
reflected most recently in the Vivitar, COPIAT, and Olympus decisions. 
The confusion could probably be mitigated by amending section 1581(i) 
to broaden the scope of international trade matters within the exclusive 
purview of the CIT. Any such expansion of the CIT's residual jurisdic-
tion may reduce the kind of confusion presented in these three grey mar-
ket goods cases, but it is not likely to eliminate the confusion entirely. 
Jurisdictional certainty between the district courts and the CIT would be 
more likely realized by repealing section 1581(i), leaving for CIT review 
those actions encompassed by section 1581(a)-(h). International trade 
litigants would thereby have the benefit of knowing, with a far greater 
degree of certainty, in which forum to bring their international trade 
actions. 
In addition, by conferring upon the district courts jurisdiction to 
hear section 1581(i) cases, especially those involving embargoes and quo-
tas where swift judicial relief is frequently imperative, litigants would 
have greater freedom to retain counsel outside of the New York City 
area. If section 1581(i) were repealed, the pressure to retain counsel with 
offices physically proximate to the CIT would be significantly reduced in 
such cases. This development, coupled with the elimination of jurisdic-
tional confusion between the district courts and the CIT, would be an 
invaluable benefit to trade litigants who, after all, were the intended bene-
ficiaries of the Act. 
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